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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
JESSE RODRIGUEZ GARCIA,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20040610-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty by a jury of one
count of Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
U.C.A. §76-5-109(3)(a).

On June 28, 2004, judgment was entered

by the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin sentencing the defendant to a
term of 365 days at the Weber County Jail.
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.

On July 19, 2004, the

This Court has jurisdiction

over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3.
STATE OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE ONE.

Was there sufficient evidence to support the

jury's verdict that the defendant was Guilty of Child Abuse, a
class A misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-109(3)(a)?
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

When challenging the sufficiency of

the evidence, "the standard of review is that the evidence and
Page 2 of
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the reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." State v.
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,

1147 (Utah 1989).

Under this analysis,

a conviction can only be overturned where the evidence "is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was
convicted.'" State v. Holqate,

2000 UT 74, II 18, 10 P.3d 346

(quoting State v. Dunn,850 P.2d 1201,
ISSUE TWO.

1212 (Utah 1993)).

Was the Defendant denied his right to effective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I
Sections Seven and Twelve of the Utah Constitution when his trial
attorney failed to pursue Defendant's claim that a witness lied
in testifying that he administered the Defendant's Miranda
warning?
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The appellate court must determine as a

matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right
to effective assistance of counsel.

In Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 688, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) f the United States Supreme
Court articulated a two-part test to determine whether counsel
was ineffective.

Under the Strickland test, an individual has

been denied the effective assistance of counsel if (1) counsel's
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performance was deficient below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant.

State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d

203, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668f 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

United States

Constitution

Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed;
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
an\d to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.

Utah

Constitution

Article I,

Section 7 Due Process.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Article I,

Section 12 Rights of Accused Persons.

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
Page 5 of
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determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute• Nothing in this constitution shall preclude
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or
rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.

Utah

Statutes

Utah Code 76-5-109;
(1) As used in this section:
(a)

"Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age.

(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection
(2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1.
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a
child which impairs the physical condition of the child,
including:
(i)

a bruise or other contusion of the skin;

(ii)
(iii)

a minor laceration or abrasion;
failure to thrive or malnutrition; or

(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or
welfare and which is not a serious physical injury as defined in
Subsection (1)(d).
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set
of injuries which seriously impairs the child's health, or which
involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm to the
child, or which Involves
a substantial risk of death to the
child, including:
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(i)

fracture of any bone or bones;

(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the
brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or causing the child's
head to impact with an object or surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or
those
caused by placing a hot object upon the skin or body of the
child;
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined
in Section 76-1-601;
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted
by the same person, either at the same time or on different
occasions;
(vi)

any damage to internal organs of the body;

(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe
emotional harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or
severe impairment of the child's ability to function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member,
limb, or organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even
if resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to
thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child
is guilty of an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
felony of the second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third
degree; or
Page 7 of
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(c) if done with criminal negligencef the offense is a class A
misdemeanor,
(3) Any
having the
another to
offense as

person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or,
care or custody of such child, causes or permits
inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
follows:

(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class
A misdemeanor;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor;
or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C
misdemeanor.
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with
treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, in lieu of
medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of
an established church or religious denomination of which the
parent or legal guardian is a member or adherent shall not, for
that reason alone, be deemed to have committed an offense under
this section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Garcia was charged in a single count Information dated
September 18, 2001, with the offense of Child Abuse, a Class A
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-109(3)(a).

A

jury trial was held on January 9,2002, the Honorable Parley R.
Baldwin presiding.

After the one-day jury trial, the jury

returned with a verdict of ''guilty."

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to
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the jury verdictf is as follows:
Reyna Hassenrik ("Hassenrik"), the child's mother, testified
that her son, J.S., was born December 19, 1996.

In September

2001 Hassenrik lived with Garcia, with J.S., in an apartment in
Ogden, Utah.

As of September 17, 2001, she and J.S.

had been

living with Garcia for about one and a half weeks. Trial
On September 17, 2001, she, J.S.
dinner, J.S.
pout." Trial

TR p

and Garcia sat down to

didn't like the "looks of it" and he "started to
TR p 18.

started to cry." Trial

J.S. continued to pout and "then he
TR p 19.

quiet and eat his dinner."

Id.

Garcia told "told him to be
J.S. continued to cry and

Garcia "grabbed him by the arm and took him in his room."
TR p

18.

Trial

20.

The testimony described the apartment as not "very big."
Trial

TR p 21.

It had one big bedroom and one little bedroom.

It had "the table area where you eat and the kitchen and the
bathroom and a balcony on the outside."
J.S.

Hassenrik, Garcia and

were eating in the kitchen area on the evening of September

17, 2001.

The bedroom is "not far away" from the kitchen area.

Id.
Hassenrik did not follow Garcia and J.S.
initially.

into the bedroom

Garcia closed to door to the bedroom and Hassenrik

did not observe what took place in the bedroom.
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Trial

TR p

22.

She testified that she did hear noises and at trial she made
slapping sounds.

Trial

TR p 22.

She testified that she could

hear "him crying and screaming." Trial

TR p 23.

She "knew that

he was in trouble" and that "he [Garcia] told him to sit there
and be quiet and calm down until he can come out and eat his
dinner."
J.S.

Id.
returned to the table, but he didn't want to eat.

Garcia took J.S. back in the room.

Id.

This second time,

Hassenrik went "over to the couch because I was scared and I was
listening to what was going on." Trial
slapping sounds.

TR p 24.

She heard more

She then "went in there and told him to stop."

Id.
Hassenrik testified that she didn't see anything when she
entered the room and that Garcia told her to "go out, that he
would take care of it."
he was crying hard."

Trial

TR p 25.

J.S.'s "face was red and

Id.

Hassenrik testified that she "didn't do anything" when she
saw J.S.

on the bed crying, but that she left the room and sat

on a couch outside of the bedroom.

Trial

TR p 27.

J.S.

remained in the room with Garcia for a "couple of minutes," then
J.S.

went back to the table and Garcia came out of the bedroom.

Garcia told J.S. again to eat his dinner.
"mom, no, I don't want to eat it."
Page 10 of
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J.S.

started crying,

TR p 28.

Hassenrik

testified that Garcia then took J.S.

back into the bedroom.

Hassenrik was in the kitchen doing the dishes, when she heard
"the belt hitting my child." Trial

TR. P 29.

Hassenrik went

into the bedroom and observed Garcia "smacking him with the belt
on his butt.
room."

I told him to stop and he told me to leave the

J.S. 's shorts were pulled down, and there was nothing

covering his buttocks. Id.

Garcia had a belt. Trial

TR p

30.

Hassenrik left the room and called a friend, Maxine.

Trial

TR p

31.

Hassenrik identified photographs of a child's legs with
marks on them to be J.S.'s legs, that she recognized his shorts,
that J.S. had been wearing those shorts on September 17, 2001,
that the marks appearing on the photographs on J.S. 's legs

were

not present before J.S.

Trial

TR p 32.

went into the bedroom with Garcia.

She also testified that she saw the buckle of the belt

Garcia struck J.S.

with, and she identified a photograph of the

belt on the floor of the bedroom.

Trial

TR p 33.

She also

identified the belt as belonging to Garcia. Jd.
Joseph War testified that he is a friend of Hassenrik's who
received a telephone call from Maxine on September 17, 2001. He
went to Hassenrikfs residence on September 17 because "she needed
a ride to leave the residence."

Trial

TR p 38.

He didn't knock

on the door, but understood that Hassenrik would come outside.
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He waited for approximately one hour. Trial

TR p 40.

He

testified that he was "worried about her," that he went to the
door to see if he could hear anything because he saw various
lights come off and on, he saw an individual at the apartment,
and he only heard silence, so "got worried so I called the
police." Trial
arrived.

TR p 40.

War was at the apartment when the police

Id.

Sgt. Roger L. Hunt of South Ogden Police Department
responded to War's call.

Trial

TR p 41.

Hunt testified that law

enforcement was contacted by an individual by the name of Joseph
War. Trial

TR p 42.

After speaking with War,

Hunt went to the

apartment, made contact with Garcia, and asked to speak with
Hassenrik. Trial

TR p 43.

Hunt did speak with Hassenrik who

"explained there was an incident that night involving her son and
Mr. Garcia, involving her child and a beating situation. She felt
it got a little bit out of hand as far as Mr. Garcia spanking her
son and was very concerned for her own welfare and the child's
welfare." Trial

TR p 44.

Hunt could see marks on the child and

he called medical to respond. Trial
child were taken at the hospital.

TR p 45.
Id.

Photographs of the

Hunt identified the

photographs and "some of the welts and stuff that I observed on
the small child." Id.

Sgt Hunt testified that "basically the

mark of the buckle itself along with the little gong that comes
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out that is used to secure the belt matched at least one of the
marks that was on the small child."

Trial

TR p 47.

Hunt

"compared the belt" himself...and "also held the belt up next to
the mark itself and had photographs taken to show that the two
matched." Trial

TR p 48.

Hunt was asked whether the injuries he

observed on the child appeared to be consistent with being made
by the belt.

He replied "yes."

Id.

Detective William D. Wentland, South Ogden Police Department
also testified at trial. Wentland was called by Hunt on
September 17, 2001, to the Garcia apartment.

Wentland testified

that he asked Garcia whether he had any questions about his
Miranda rights, which he understood had been administered by
Hunt, and if Garcia was 'willing to speak to us."
Garcia indicated he would speak with Wentland.

Trial

TR p

60.

Wentland

testified that Garcia told him "himself and the child's mother
and the child were eating dinner at the dinner table and that the
child has refused to each (sic) some of the meat that was on his
plate.

At that time he took the child in the bedroom, pulled his

pants down and spanked him with a belt on the buttock and as he
did that, the child moved and he struck his leg several times."
Id.

According to Wentland, Garcia related a "second incident"

in which Garcia said he "pulled the child's pants down and
spanked him with a belt on the bed."
Page 13 of
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TR p

61.

Wentland testified, further, that when asked if he (Garcia)
had "gone too far in disciplining the child" he, "at that point
he admitted to me that he thought he had." Trial

TR p

61.

During the trial, defense counsel brought to the court's
attention a concern raised by the defendant over testimony by one
officer that he had given the defendant his Miranda warnings.
According to the defendant, the first officer did not read him
his "Miranda rights," rather, "the second officer did."
TR. P 70.

Trial

The defendant was apparently concerned that statements

made by him to the first officer were "being used against me
now."

Id.

"...lying.

The defendant contended that the second officer was
If he went in the Court saying that he did not read

me my rights, then he's lying."

Trial

TR p 71.

Garcia alleged

discrepancies in who administered the Miranda warnings, and other
factual differences.

Id.

Garcia then took the stand and testified that Hassenrik and
her son had been visiting with him for four or five days as of
September 17, 2001. Trial

TR at 74.

Prior to that day, Garcia,

Hassenrik and her son had taken a trip to Arizona, that "he had
not been eating, that he hadn't eaten for the whole trip and he
didn't eat the day before the trip." Trial

TR at

74.

According

to Garcia, it had been "about five or five days" since the child
had eaten.

He instructed J.S. to eat and when J.S.
Page 14 of
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did not eat,

Garcia warned him "you need to eat, you haven't eaten in days.
If you don't eat, I'm going to have to spank you."
75.

Trial

TR at

When J.S. refused to eat, Garcia "escorted him to the
Id.

bedroom and swatted him."

Garcia testified that he

swatted J.S. two or three times with the belt on two occasions
that night, and on the third occasion he took him to his room and
put him to bed. Trial

TR at

77.

According to Garcia,

he used

the belt because he felt that if he hit him with his hand, he
would "do more damage with my hand" than with the belt.
not intend to cause physical injury to J.S.

Trial

TR at

He did
77.

Hassenrik returned to the stand and testified that J.S. had
been eating, that he wasn't starving or going without proper
nourishment and food.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Garcia argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of the class A misdemeanor Child Abuse, and that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel's
refusal to pursue the impeachment of a witness who testified he
did not read Garcia the Miranda warning when Garcia insisted he
did so. Counsel has been unable to find a non-frivolous basis for
the defendant's claims.

For this reason, this brief is filed in

accordance with the guidelines set forth in Anders v. California,
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386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d (Utah 1981).
ARGUMENT
Utah Code section 76-5-109(3)(a) provides, in relevant part,
that,
Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or,
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of
an offense

as follows:

(a)

If

done

intentionally or

knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor... . Utah
law defines "physical injury" as "an injury to or condition
of a child which impairs the physical condition of the
child, including: (i) a bruise or other contusion of the
skin... . U.C.A. §76-5-109(l)(c)... (c)(iv) any other
condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and
which is not a serious physical injury...
This Court generally will not address a claim raised for
the first time on appeal, absent a demonstration of plain error
or exceptional circumstances.
P.3d 346.

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10

Garciafs challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

at this time obligates him to demonstrate "first, that the
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime(s)
charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to
the jury."

Id. at 17.

In State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 55 P.3d 1131, the court
affirmed the jury's guilty verdict to child kidnaping, aggravated
kidnaping and aggravated sexual abuse of an eight-year-old child.
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The State presented evidence that the child was eight-year-old,
that she was approached by a man asking for her assistance, that
the child followed the man away from the location she had been
left by her mother, that the defendant was the man who lured her
away from the location, and that there was no other plausible
reason for the defendant to lure her away.

The Court reviewed

the evidence presented by the State and concluded that there was
nothing to suggest that "reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that [Diaz] committed the crime."

Icl at f 36,

citing State v. Holqate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346.
In the instant case, the State's evidence included:
(1)

J.S. was born December 19, 1996. Garcia's conduct giving
rise to the allegations occurred on September 17, 2001.
J.S. was then four years and 8 months of age.

(2)

Garcia was Hassenrik's boyfriend. She and her son, J.S.
resided with Garcia. Garcia assumed the role of
disciplinarian.

(3)

On September 17, 2001, Garcia, Hassenrik and J.S. were at
the dinner table and J.S. did not want to eat.

(4)

Garcia warned J.S. that if he didn't eat his food, Garcia
would spank him.

(5)

J.S. did not eat his food and Garcia removed J.S. to the
bedroom where he struck J.S. several times with a belt to
discipline him for not eating his dinner.

(6)

Before J.S. was led into the bedroom by Garcia, he did not
have marks and welts on his legs.

(7)

Garcia "swatted" J.S. several times with a belt. Garcia
used the belt because he "felt if I hit him with my hand,
Page 17 of
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I'd do more damage with my hand than I would the belt."
(8)

Hassenrik could hear J.S. "crying and screaming" and she
"knew that he was in trouble" when Garcia had J.S. in the
bedroom.

(9)

Photographs of the marks on J.S.'s back and legs showed
marks consistent with the shape of the belt and its
buckle.

(10)

Law enforcement sought medical assistance for the child.
It is impossible to argue that the foregoing evidence was

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
J.S. was a "child" as of September 17, 2001, that J.S. was in
Garcia's care on that date, that Garcia intentionally or
knowingly used a belt to inflict physical injury on J.S. or any
other condition which imperils J.S.'s health or welfare.
Inasmuch as it cannot be demonstrated that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction, it follows that there is no
argument for an obvious and fundamental insufficiency such that
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury.
Garcia next argues that he was denied his right to
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to
pursue Garciafs contention that a witness lied in testifying that
the witness administered Garcia his Miranda
not contend his Miranda

warnings. Garcia does

warning was not administered and any

statements made by him should have been suppressed.
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Garcia

claims he received his Miranda

warning from the "second

detective" rather than the first officer.
To show that trial counsel was ineffective, Garcia must
show: (1) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's
performance prejudiced the defendant.

State v. Martinez, 2001 UT

12, 26 P.3d 203, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Trial counsel's conduct must fall

outside a wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, "the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the
circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound
trial strategy. " " State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 139,
(citations omitted).

To establish "prejudice", Garcia must show

a "reasonable probability...that except for the ineffective
counsel, the result would have been different."

Jd. quoting

State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 27, 3 P.3d 777 (citations omitted).
During the trial's recess, defense counsel brought to the
trial court's attention Garcia's concerns about the testimony of
one of the witnesses.

Garcia reported to the court that the

witness "lied" when he testified that it was the detective who
had given the Miranda warning.

According to Garcia, "then the

second detective came, he introduced himself, he said I am
Detective so-and-so, these are your Miranda rights, would you
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like to talk to me."

Trial

TR p 66.

Garcia stated he did not

understand why "is everybody making a big old point to state that
my Miranda rights were read by a certain officer that they were
not?"

Trial

TR p 67.

Garcia asserted that "if he (the witness)

went in the court saying he did not read me my rights, then he's
lying."

During one exchange, the Court asked Garcia:

Q:

(Court) And you're telling me that he gave you your
Miranda rights so what is the issue?

A:

(Garcia)
didn't.

He didn't he just stated that the (sic)
He just stated on the record that he did

not read me—

Trial

Q:

(Court) But you're telling me that he did.

A:

(Garcia) Yes sir, that's what happened.

Q:

(Court) Then there's no—

A:

(Garcia) But for the record.

Q:

(Court) I'm not going to argue—

A:

(Garcia) I just don't understand your honor.

TR p

72.

At that point, trial counsel asked for additional time to
talk with the defendant. At the conclusion of the recess, Garcia
raised no further concerns about the officer's testimony, nor did
he raise concerns about counsel's representation.

Garcia did,

however, elect to take the witness stand and testify.
Page 20 of

25

Taking the witness stand, Garcia testified that he
instructed J.S. to eat, that when J.S. didn't eat he "escorted
him to the bedroom and swatted him" with a belt "two or three
times" and "it was two or three times on the first occasion."
Trial

TR p 75.

Garcia then "warned him if you don't try the food

then I'm going to have to spank you again."

Trial

TR p 76.

J.S.

did not eat and Garcia "escorted him to the bedroom again."

Id.

Garcia "swatted him two or three more times" with "the belt."
Id.

On cross examination, Garcia identified "one, two, three,

four, five" marks from a photograph of J.S.'s legs.
Even if counsel had cross examined the police officer as
requested by the defendant and succeeded in discrediting all of
his testimony, the most damaging testimony from Hunt would have
consisted of his testimony of his conversation with Hassenrik
during which she related that she was concerned for her own
welfare and the welfare of the child, that Hassenrik explained
there was an incident involving her child and a beating
situation, his descriptions of the marks he observed on the child
and his decision to call medical to respond.

Hunt's testimony

included his observations of the buckle and the comparison of the
buckle to at least one of the marks on J.S.
discounted all

If the jury had

of Hunt's testimony, it still cannot be argued
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that the evidence is

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently

improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that Garcia committed the offense.

Excluding

Hunt's testimony, the evidence would still show:
(1)

J.S. was born December 19, 1996. Garcia's conduct giving
rise to the allegations occurred on September 17, 2001.
J.S. was then four years and 8 months of age.

(2)

Garcia was Hassenrik's boyfriend. She and her son, J.S.
resided with Garcia. Garcia assumed the role of
disciplinarian.

(3)

On September 17, 2001, Garcia, Hassenrik and J.S. were at
the dinner table and J.S. did not want to eat.

(4)

Garcia warned J.S. that if he didn't eat his food, Garcia
would spank him.

(5)

J.S. did not eat his food and Garcia removed J.S. to the
bedroom where he struck J.S. several times with a belt to
discipline him for not eating his dinner.

(6)

Before J.S. was led into the bedroom by Garcia, he did not
have marks and welts on his legs.

(7)

Garcia "swatted" J.S. several times with a belt. Garcia
used the belt because he "felt if I hit him with my hand,
I'd do more damage with my hand than I would the belt."

(8)

Hassenrik could hear J.S. "crying and screaming" and she
"knew that he was in trouble" when Garcia had J.S. in the
bedroom.

(9)

Photographs revealed marks on J.S.'s back and legs.
Garcia does not content he did not receive his Miranda

warning; Garcia does not claim counsel was deficient in failing
to warn him against taking the stand in his defense. Garcia
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claims that his trial attorney failed to ask important cross
examination questions of a witness whof in Garcia's opinion,
committed per jury when he testified he did not "read me my
rights."
Assume for the sake of argument that counsel's failure to
cross examine the witness about his testimony that he did not
give the Miranda warning as he testified did rise to the level of
deficient performance such that counsel was not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment•

It is impossible

to argue that the outcome of the trial would have been different
had counsel succeeded in discrediting the witness and the jury
ignored the police officer's complete testimony, and

the court

had suppressed all statements made by Garcia to the police
officer.

Hassenrik's testimony, Wentland's testimony and

Garcia's own testimony provided sufficient evidence to support
the conviction.
Counsel has diligently examined the testimony at trial,
the applicable statutory and case lawf and has been unable to
find any law to support the Defendant's position.

The Defendant

expressed his desire to appeal the sufficiency of the evidence
and trial counsel's failure to discredit one witness's testimony.
For these reasons, counsel respectfully requests permission to
withdraw from further representation of the Defendant.
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Counsel has complied with the requirements set forth in
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Clayton,
639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).

Counsel attempted contact with

the defendant by mail to his last know home address on March 7,
2005 but the defendant did not respond.

Counsel hand-delivered a

copy of this brief to the Weber County Correctional Facility for
delivery to the defendant on March 17, 2005 and was advised by
facility staff that the document had been delivered, however the
brief was returned on March 24, 2005 and counsel learned that the
defendant had, in fact, been released from that facility.

A

final attempt to deliver the brief by certified mail to the last
known address of the defendant failed when the brief was returned
on April 4, 2005 "unable to forward."

CONCLUSION
Counsel is unable to find any non-frivolous issues to
appeal.

For this reason, counsel respectfully requests this

Court to release her as appellate counsel.
DATED this

t

day of

/Wl

, 2005.

mjjtt^
Sharon S. Sipes
Attorney for Appellant
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